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What does knowledge do – the pursuit of it, the having and exposing of              
it, the receiving again of knowledge of what one already knows? How, in             
short is knowledge performative, and how best to move among its           




Sleeping over at my ​mother-in-law’s ​house in ​Shiyeh [A Southern Suburb of Beirut] 
May 2013 [The war in ​Syria​ spilling over the border into ​Lebanon​] 
We wake up to two explosions. 
One after the other. 
The rest of the family, not noticing the sounds, continue sleeping. 
You immediately check the news. 
Nothing. 
They mentioned a gas explosion. 
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In the good old analogico-digital days we would lay in bed listening to explosions, but               
at that time we almost knew, or at least we thought we knew, whom the explosions                
were targeting. 
This time it was different. 
We return to sleep. 
20 minutes after the phone calls start ticking in. 
It is family and friends from near and far: ​Hamra ​(​central district in Beirut​), ​Accra​,               
Seattle​, ​Paris​... 
Different parts of the world and different time zones, who want to make sure that we                
are all alright. 
  
In a world shaped by Trumpian politics, neo-fascism, proxy- and Hot/Cold wars, can             
we still afford suspicion as one of the main modi operandi within critical theory and               
cultural studies? The situation requires of us to be no less critical to the politics and                
urgencies that we are subjected to, but to refrain queer, feminist & literary scholar              
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s now almost two-decade old phrasing, sited above, we           
might want to ask our selves “what does knowledge do – the pursuit of it, the having                 
and exposing of it, the receiving again of knowledge of what one already knows?”.              
Sedgwick posed these questions in her essay “Reparative Reading and Paranoid           
Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid That You Probably Think This Essay Is About You”              
(2003) in which she proposes the reparative practice or reading as a tool to              
circumvent the habitual paranoid hermeneutics of suspicion. Today the essay still           
provides an important wake-up-call to remind us that our epistemological and           
methodological toolbox needs to be repacked in response to the multiple urgencies            
and contingencies facing us today. 
Written against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis and Reaganism in the US in the               
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a lot of methodological inspiration within arts and cultural studies, affect studies,            
queer and feminist studies. The essay opens up to a possibility to read or practice for                
reparative ends, rather than staying within the paranoid “hermeneutics of suspicion”           
which according to Sedgwick, following Paul Ricoeur, has become the habitual form            
of practicing knowledge within critical theory. However, Sedgwick’s essay was          
equally criticized for aligning critical theory with paranoia and understating critical           
theory’s impact and its importance in revealing power structures in society in favour             
of more affect-oriented and ameliorative practices (Hemmings). In what follows, I           
want to suggest that the reparative practice is not anti-critical, but critical in its              
performance: it has to enact the very same paranoia it sets out to criticise, in order to                 
arrive at the reparative practice. I suggest that the reparative practice is a             
(para)paranoid practice – or a self-reflexive form of paranoia in which the subject is              
fully aware of its own paranoia, but it is only through a stylisation of the paranoid                
position that the subject is able to fashion a reparative practice. In addition, I wish to                
update the rather analogue, belated Cold War paranoia in Sedgwick’s essay to a             
digital (para)paranoia of the 21st century. To do so, I will draw on my own anecdotal                
encounters of being in the proximity to a feeling of what we might call feeling               
“car-bombed”, living and working on and off in Beirut, Lebanon between 2005-2013,            
in which numerous explosions took place, a method informed by Jane Gallop’s            
Anecdotal Theory (Gallop). The anecdotal will further be qualified by a reading of the              
seminal piece by The Atlas Group ​My Neck is Thinner than A Hair​, in which Walid                
Raad in collaboration with Tony Chakar and Bilal Khbeiz intelligently worked on the             
public feelings in the aftermath of the Lebanese wars (1975 -1991) and gathered             
multiple documents in relation to the car-bombs detonated in Beirut during that            
period (Raad and The Atlas Group). My contribution to the discussion of suspicion in              
Diffractions is to propose that the reparative practice is not to do away with paranoia               
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practitioner transforms the paranoid impulses into a creative, enabling and reflexive           
practice. More broadly, I find Sedgwick’s concept of the reparative practice useful to             
inform a practice of artistic research, in which the critical enterprise precisely resides             
in a practice of the senses or what we might call affect as critical inquiry in itself. 
To expand more fully on the relationship between the reparative practice and critical             
practice, I will work my way through the questions: How is the reparative practice              
critical? And how can we consider affect as the very basis of critical inquiry? 
  
(Para)paranoia as method 
The work of The Atlas Group as well as many of the Lebanese artists that emerged                
after the Lebanese wars is interesting to revisit to devise other epistemological and             
methodological tools that (para)paranoia gives rise to. ​In My Neck is Thinner than a              
Hair Raad, Chakar and Khbeiz set up a research collective which assembles various             
materials including documents, interviews with locals, news footage, and         
photographs concerning one particular car detonated in the neighbourhood of Furn           
El Chebak. The neighbourhood is located close to the Green Line, which divided             
Beirut into East and West during the Lebanese wars. The project also entails a              
collection of archival photographs taken by photojournalists immediately after an          
explosion, documenting the engine that is often all that remains after a detonated             
car-bomb and a map of all the car-bombs detonated in Beirut during the Civil War.               
The Atlas Group is notoriously known for embodying a sort of paranoid aesthetics, in              
which the art works are referred to as files, which are not produced by the artist, but                 
offered to him by agents including secret service officers, explosions experts and            
doctors. Subjects that in large are considered accountable and trustworthy in society. 
The art scene in Beirut has often been seen as almost too emblematic of a               
post-modern relativism, blurring fact with fiction, questioning authorship and         
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history of the war​[1]​. My aim here is not to resurrect that whole debate here, but                
rather to see what kind of methods, it offers us to address the urgencies of our                
present. As such, I will not deliver an analysis or critical judgement of The Atlas               
Group’s work, since that has already been done extensively (Lepecki;          
Wilson-Goldie), but rather use the piece’s conceptual and aesthetic method to help            
inform a notion of the reparative practice and affect as a form of critical inquiry. ​My                
Neck is Thinner than a Hair is interesting to revisit in this regard, since the piece                
conceptually deals with the affect or everyday structures of feelings that occurs            
following the protracted war period. In addition, the work combines analogue and            
digital media in a complex multi-layered performance, which in my view can be seen              
as the way in which the reparative positioned practitioner gathers the fragments she             
is left with into something like a whole. This assemblage does not form a stable and                
consistent whole, that seeks to restore an irreparable past, but forms a critical             
fabulation for the future. 
To further advance the conceptual and aesthetic toolbox of (para)paranoia I also            
draw on cultural theorist and feminist scholar Sianne Ngai’s work on paranoia in her              
book ​Ugly Feelings (Ngai). Drawing on various debates around language, feminism           
and conceptual poetry Ngai notes how women, queers, people of colour, former            
colonised subjects and people with disabilities are denied the status of criticality,            
because we always arrive too late or are construed “belated”. Through the            
conceptual poetry of writers such as Juliana Spahr and Diana Ward, Ngai develops a              
certain kind of female self-reflexive paranoia, or (para)paranoia, in which the subject            
knows that she is always already reactively construed and belated, yet, this very             
belatedness or complicity becomes the very condition of agency. According to Ngai,            
paranoia is precisely valorised as knowledge when claimed by some subjects or            
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[P]aranoia can be denied the ​status of epistemology when claimed by           
some subjects, while valorized for precisely that status when claimed by           
others. In the former case (female paranoia), a mode of knowledge           
structured by an affective orientation already involving the cognition that          
power operates systemically will be reduced to its subjective implications          
alone (an ignoble ‘emotionalism’); in the latter (male), paranoia’s         
cognitive dimensions will be emphasized as an enabling condition for          
knowledge (Ngai 302). 
  
Reading Ngai’s definition of paranoia as a form of knowledge when claimed by some              
and an emotionalism when claimed by others, next to The Atlas Group’s works that              
are documents, offered to the group by doctors and scientists embody a similar             
(para)paranoid logic. When presented by the gang of fictive agents, the work is             
requiring or demanding of its audience a status of truth. And it is precisely since it                
borders on the undecidability between artistic/scientific, enabling/pathological       
paranoia that it is able to wrest the paranoia from a stiffening, deadlock narrative and               
to become an enabling, creative practice. 
  
Propelled by Ngai, the Atlas Group and my own anecdotal experiences, I have             
paranoidly mimicked and mirrored Sedgwick’s composite sketch of paranoia, which          
she spends her entire essay outlining to arrive at the reparative practice, to update              
the reparative practice’s criticality to a form of (para)paranoia. 
  
Paranoia is anticipatory. (Para)paranoia is meanwhile and & at the       
same time. 
Paranoia is reflexive and mimetic. (Para)paranoia is habit and practice. 
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Paranoia is a theory of negative affects. (Para)paranoia is a theory of affects. 
Paranoia places its faith in exposure. (Para)paranoia does not place its faith in             
exposure. 
  
(Para)paranoia is meanwhile and & at the same time. 
Back in the living room in ​Shiyeh​, we gather around the TV set to watch the breaking                 
news reporting ​LIVE from what had happened, and what is happening, Now, outside             
the apartment, on the other side of the wall, 50m up the road and 50m down the                 
road, where the two rockets struck. 
As we watch the television transmitting ​LIVE​, we discuss what to do: how to              
evacuate the family, while at the same time continuing the day as planned, meeting              
up with our friends for a picnic in ​the mountains. 
Even though the time that had passed might not have been more than 20 minutes, it                
felt like hours. The time as I experienced it was extremely slowed down, as if my                
inner camera was recording everything in 50,000 frames per second. 
The competing formats created a time code conflict between the different frame            
rates in the room with the TV set broadcasting live in 25 frames per second and that                 
of my internal one broadcasting at 50,000 per second. 
My ​mother-in-law​, pleased that ​family ​and friends ​were calling from ​near ​and ​afar             
and having lived her whole life in this volatile situation, did not seem to share the                
same panic that I tried to supress, now that I knew that the rockets were small and                 
homemade and their damage limited. 
Downstairs, at the ​neighbours​, yet another temporality was unfolding. 
The ​family was mourning their ​nephew coming home from the war in ​Syria in a               
coffin. 
We finally left the house and drove the less than 10 km into the ​centre​. 
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People there did not take much notice of the events in ​the suburbs​. 
The Marathon had just finished; 
people drinking coffee in the cafés; 
a woman packing her car to go to ​the beach ​with her children. 
Our time hooked up to normative time and life continued as usual. 
We went to ​the mountains ​with our ​friends​. 
  
The first imperative of paranoia, according to Sedgwick, is that there must be no bad               
surprises. Surprise is what the paranoid tries to eliminate by knowing in advance             
what will come in the future. As a result, paranoia has a complex relationship to               
temporality that “burrows backward and forward because there must be no bad            
surprises” and “news [must] be already known” (Sedgwick 130). While          
(para)paranoia shares a complex relationship to temporality it seems to steer this            
complexity even further. 
In Ngai’s reading of Diana Ward’s poem “Imaginary Movie”, she notes how            
over-the-top usages of repetition of the conjunction in the stanza “meanwhile & and             
at the same time”, link two terms that independently signify the temporal coexistence             
of events “meanwhile” and “at the same time”. To Ngai this incident, in which the               
poem’s subjects, who are watching the screen to find themselves spoken for in             
advance, opens up to two relationships to time existing within the same stanza or              
space: one that is “overdetermined simultaneity or contemporaneousness” and at the           
same time a “sense of redundancy and belatedness”(Ngai 305). Returning to my            
own experience described above, I want to suggest that the conjunction captures            
what I elsewhere has called “affect’s time”, when an affective experience enables a             
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In the essay “What is a Critic”, Irit Rogoff suggests a notion of “geography in real                
time” as the moment in which “some nebulous half- acknowledged entity, previously            
no more than a vague unease or a partially avowed recognition, crashes into our              
own reality by becoming a reality itself. The events of September 11 were an              
instance of suddenly being forced to live in real time.” (Rogoff 4). While 9/11, can be                
seen as the last real televisual event, in which the world’s clocks were synched to               
the time of American broadcasting agencies, I want to consider the ways in which my               
own experience opened up to a different experience of the “(a)live”, which was not              
televisual, but digitally perceived, not “always already” but “meanwhile and & at the             
same time”? In short, how did that situation enable multiple temporalities to coexist             
within the same room? 
Rogoff ’s quote describes a situation in which some dormant not yet realized             
(cognitive) but by the senses, vague unease crashes into our own reality by             
becoming a reality itself. This description, in which an affect that has hereto forth              
existed as pre-personal entity, not yet fully registered by the subject or not yet              
materialized itself into a fully quantifiable piece of information, emotion or knowledge,            
suddenly clashes with reality and becomes a reality of its own, encapsulate an             
understanding of affect as a critical encounter. What I want to suggest here is that               
Rogoff’s description of “geography in real time” describes an instant or incident            
where affect collides with matter, rips the matter from the movement of which it              
should form part and opens up directly to time or to an experience of time as direct.                 
That day in the living room, I had an experience of conflicting time frames existing               
within the same living room – on the one hand extremely slow while at the same time                 
extremely speeded up. As such the conjunction of the “meanwhile &, and at the              
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Part of The Atlas Groups works that are grouped under the title ​My Neck is thinner                
than a Hair contains a series of black-and-white photographs documenting the only            
remainder after a detonated car bomb, the engine, which often is catapulted out of              
the car and lands several meters away from the explosion. The engines are             
photographed by photojournalists. But the photographs are displayed showing the          
front and the annotated back of the photograph at the same time. As such they both                
anticipates or mimics digitisation of archival material where front and back are often             
scanned and stored at the same time. But by displaying both the front and the back                
alongside each other they perform an unfolded temporality – or what we might             
situate with John Akomfrah as “the Janus head of the photographic event”, one that              
points to that which was (the past) and one that points to that which might be (the                 
future) (Akomfrah). As such the photographs and their performance, so to speak, is             
not a paranoid attempt to try to eliminate what might come in the future, but rather an                 
unfolding of time where past, present and future co-exist alongside one another. 
So how might this temporal disjunction or oversaturation of time allure us to the              
possibilities of affect as a form of critical inquiry? Returning to Sedgwick’s            
introductory question on the performativity of knowledge I find interesting, when she            
notes “the receiving again of knowledge of what one already knows?” (Sedgwick            
2003:124). While Sedgwick in this question refers to the paranoid’s mimicry and            
inhabitation of already knowing in advance, read in light of Rogoff’s notion of             
“geography in real time” it almost come to signify that there are certain knowledges –               
tacit, affective, contingent, intuitive, indigenous flows – that we carry within us or             
walk among, and sometimes an affective encounter activate that knowledge and it            
becomes an entity of its own. The ripped out engines comes to form such entities               
that disassemble to form new assemblages and in that process they open up to              
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As I am watching the DVD-documentation of the performance ​My Neck is thinner             
than a Hair in The Lebanese Associaition for Plastic Arts, Ashkal Alwan’s archive             
(2015), I cannot help but to feel a weird sensation of temporal disjunction. In the               
performance Raad, Khbeiz & Chaker meticulously gathered artefacts, testimonies         
and possible agents into a multi-layered PowerPoint performance that investigates          
the detonated car in Furn el Chebeck. The performance took place in May 2004, only               
a few months before a new series of car-bombs were launched and which led to the                
assassination of prime minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005. The performance            
in ways treats the event as pertaining to the past, but while doing so the event keeps                 
unfolding in the present and into the future. Into a point in the future where I am                 
looking at the documentation of the performance from now, the archive.​[2] 
  
(Para)paranoia is habit and practice. 
Sedgwick’s second definition of paranoia is that “one understands paranoia only by            
oneself practicing paranoid knowing, and that the way paranoia has of understanding            
anything is by imitating and embodying it” (Sedgwick 131). Sedgwick’s essay points            
to this paranoid mimesis as “circumscrib(ing) its potential as a medium of political or              
cultural struggle”, but she cannot help but enact this implicit knowingness and            
mimesis in her own essay. Only by enacting paranoid knowing is she able to mutate               
paranoia into a reparative practice. The reparative reading or practice enacts a            
certain paranoia, which is perfectly aware of its own paranoia; hence (para)paranoia.            
Rather than letting paranoia grow “like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting             
out any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to              
understand”, (para)paranoia becomes a mutable position (Sedgwick 131). As such, it           
is less a circumscription of potential agency, but it becomes the very premise for              
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Returning to my own feeling of “feeling car-bombed” what started as a default,             
maybe even an intuition or just a slight unease, might be turned into a habit or                
practice, which the subject continues to embody many years afterwards, even when            
the immediate reason for doing so has abated. 
Habit is central here in that it is both the form and method through which paranoia is                 
enacted, but it is eventually only through this enactment or stylisation of a habitual              
practice that the possibility of continuing to live emerges. In Sedgwick’s own case, it              
is only through her own over-the-top acting out of paranoia throughout the essay that              
she is able to come up with the notion of the reparative. Habit and practice come to                 
play an important part in Sedgwick’s Buddhist practice as the way in which the              
subject, through a refinement of the practice of everyday life, changes or styles             
herself, to continue living.​[3] 
Philosopher Cathrine Malabou exquisitely brings the dual enterprise of habit to life, in             
her introduction to Félix Ravaisson’s work  Of Habit​: 
  
There are, in the European philosophical tradition, two basic ways of           
speaking of Habit. (...) The first (Aristotle, Hegel, Maine De Biran,           
Ravaisson, Bergson) sees in habit a primary ontological phenomenon.         
For beings subject to change, habit is the law of being. Without a             
general and permanent disposition, a ‘virtue’, which is developed as a           
result of change, as resistance to this change, the finite being cannot            
endure, would not have time to live. For such a being, being is fused              
with the habit of being. The second way (Descartes, Kant etc.) sees in             
habit the epitome of inauthenticity, a simulacrum of being, an imitation of            
virtue. Pure mechanism, routine process, devitalization of sense, habit is          
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stifles the voice, repeatable but never stale, of the categorical          
imperative. (Malabou vii) 
  
Malabou asks if we are not habituated by the latter version of habit, that is habit as                 
inauthentic imitation of being. Malabou’s differentiation between the two basic          
understandings of habit might resonate with the difference between repetition and           
the reparative as seen in the work of Judith Butler and Sedgwick. In Butler’s early               
work, mimesis, repetition and re-appropriation is often seen as the only means for             
agency in today’s world. This understanding of repetition is, according to Sedgwick            
producing a stiff, deadlocked narrative in which nothing new can emerge. But if there              
can never be one habit (mimetic) without habit (vitalist), then Sedgwick’s and Butler’s             
habitual practices are part of the same mould. In other words, this affirms that it is                
one and the same force, which produces habit at once as grace (ease, facility,              
power) and as addiction (machinic repetition), as Malabou reminds us (Malabou vii).            
And it is precisely through this habit or stylization of the self that Sedgwick and Butler                
come to approach one another. In Butler’s reading of Foucault’s “What is Critique”,             
critique precisely becomes a practice, a virtue, or art of existence in which the              
subject styles itself in order to continue living (Butler). In Sedgwick, the paranoid             
position is able to migrate to a depressive position, which she describes as a              
Foucaultian “care of the self”. Here the subject provides the self with “pleasure and              
nourishment” in an environment that is otherwise perceived as hostile (Sedgwick:           
137). 
Raad, Chakar and Khbeiz enact certain paranoid habitual practice – because they            
cannot afford not to, or because growing up during the Lebanese Civil War, certain              
practices that to people growing up in peace time would seem totally arbitrary,             
became habitual. As such, while the work mocks or mimics a paranoid habitual             
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living. From the basis of that we can deduce that (para)paranoia and affect as a               
critical inquiry one is not dissociated from one’s object of inquiry, but closely             
intertwined with it (Rogoff). (Para)paranoia requires a sort of relational, habitual           
practice in which one has constantly to analyse and anticipate what objects and             
subjects in one’s vicinity might do and how best to move among its causes and               
effects. As such, this alertness is extended beyond the limits of the subject and              
forms a co-assemblage with the objects/subjects it involves. Manoeuvring this          
situation requires agility, improvisation, intuition and being literally attuned “to the           
heartbeat of contingency” (Sedgwick). (Para)paranoia has a different relationship to          
narrative development. One does not proceed from a – b, since a sniper or an               
explosion might get in one’s way so instead one takes detours or go from A to F and                  
back to C to reach B[4].  
 
Paranoia is a poor mapping 
In the Atlas Group’s online Archive, ​The Thin Neck Files includes a map with the               
title: “I was overcome with a momentary panic at the thought that they might be right”                
(Raad). The file is a map or scaled model of the 3,641 car bombs detonated in Beirut                 
between 1975 and 1991. The map is attributed to Nahia Hassan, whom we are told               
was a senior topographer in the Lebanese Army’s Directorate of Geographic Affairs.            
Hassan had presented the map to the Lebanese parliament’s Committee on           
Development and Reconstruction in 1994, and created such a fuss that it led to a               
suspension of all reconstruction activities. In addition, we are told that this is a replica               
of the original model, which was vandalised and destroyed during the debates. I am              
not so interested in the whole narrative that surrounds the map, and whether or not it                
is true, but rather that the map itself is “weak” or “poor”. The map does not create an                  
all-encompassing strong theory which can account for the complex mesh that makes            
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accountability as a map and the epistemic and operational power that comes with             
being a map. But precisely because of that, and as a consequence of being full of                
holes, a replica of an original, is the map able to capture the contingencies of affect. 
In the article “In Defence of the Poor Image”, Hito Steyerl propels an image economy               
of the poor and the wretched of the screen, in response to the hegemony of               
high-resolution images in what she calls “the late screen capitalism” (Steyerl). The            
emergence of the poor images, through the distribution and sharing of low-resolution            
copies of copies on web-networks as YouTube and Ubuweb, are constructing           
anonymous global networks and shared histories, what we might situate with Dalida            
María Benfield as a tri-continental third cinema of the now that is operating from              
within rather than from the outside and against (Benfield). The poor image, Steyerl             
writes 
  
builds alliances as it travels, provokes translation or mistranslation, and          
creates new publics and debates. By losing its visual substance it           
recovers some of its political punch and creates a new aura around it.             
This aura is no longer based on the permanence of the ’original,’ but on              
the transience of the copy. It is no longer anchored within a classical             
public sphere mediated and supported by the frame of the nation-state           
or corporation, but floats on the surface of temporary and dubious data            
pools. (Steyerl) 
  
Reading Steyerl’s notion of the poor image in view of The Atlas Group’s map is it                
possible to conceive of “poor mapping” as a self-reflexive, ethico-aesthetic practice           
of (para)paranoia? Poor mapping does not aim at building an all-encompassing           
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but from which the subject can navigate and manoeuvre in an environment that             
might be hostile to the subject? 
What characterizes paranoia, according to Sedgwick, is that it is a strong theory of              
negative affect, which leaves no room for contingencies and good or bad surprises.             
The paranoid is always already able to analyse and know in advance what its              
adversaries would be able to do it and thus ward off any future contingencies              
whether good or bad. In contrast poor mapping does not offer an all-encompassing             
theory, but rather opens up to other modes, or more tacit and contingent forms of               
knowledge production. The Atlas Group has to enact certain paranoid strategies and            
to ally themselves with the traditional producers of true, scientific knowledge           
(topographers, secret agents, doctors etc.), and their findings are presented as           
diagrams and maps. But the map is literally full of holes; it is a strong map but only in                   
its quality of being poor – a copy of a destroyed original, its data-basis in itself                
dubious. 
Would it be possible to say that the quest is not so much how to build an                 
all-encompassing strong theory, but to loosely weave a poor map out of the             
fragments, partial objects, catapulted engines and shrapnel shells one is left with.            
And this poor map forms an ethico-aesthetic paradigm, which does not try to signify              
and communicate or to govern and control, but to produce assemblages of            
enunciation capable of capturing affective layers and singularities of the situation           
(Guattari). An affect-scape, which does not “operate from a single principle that            
maps everything in an outward-bound motion with itself at the centre” (Rogoff), but             
rather forms a mapping that is composed of clusters of intensities. 
  
(Para)paranoia does not place its faith in exposure. 
[​Beirut 2005] Black banners and posters with white inscription in ​Arial Black​,             
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THE TRUTH of who had planted the one-ton TNT car bomb that blew up ​Prime               
Minister Rafik Hariri ​alongside 21 of his security and advisors on ​14th ​of ​February              
2005. As the years passed, the digital clock, at the entrance to ​Hamra Street​, which               
marks the days since the assassination, reached more than a thousand. The clock 
ran out of digits to continue its task. 
The banners vanished from the cityscape, but ​THE TRUTH​ remained concealed. 
What had happened to desire of knowing ​THE TRUTH​? 
Had the promise of ​THE TRUTH ​itself expired? 
Had the machine, invented to count the point in a near-possible future, when we              
would know ​THE TRUTH​, reached its own limit? 
  
Placing their fate in exposure is where the analog paranoia and the digital             
(para)paranoia might differ the most. The (para)paranoid position, operates from the           
contingent position that knows, that no matter how hard we try to know ​THE TRUTH​,               
we will never know. The (para)paranoid knows that it is a complex, enmeshed             
assemblage of conspiracy theories, foreign powers, intelligence services and         
cell-phone networks, where each one in itself contains as many different factors as             
what we call “the weather”. No matter how hard we try “to reveal” it, “to untangle” the                 
mesh, “to map out” the different components, we know that we will never know. Or               
by the time we are done mapping, the map itself has moved on. But this does not                 
mean that the (para)paranoid reduces everything to post-post-modern relativism,         
because the (para)paranoid knows that when it hits, it hits violently, physically and             
materially. Even when it hits discursively, it burns and injures. As such, the             
(para)paranoid always analyses, screens her surroundings, takes detours and         
changes sidewalks, simply because she cannot afford not to. She knows that, no             
matter how great the desire for the truth, she will never know, but she is still left with                  





(Para)paranoia: Affect as Critical Inquiry 










paranoid brothers. She assembles the data into huge data visualisations only to find             
that they are full of holes, a copy of a destroyed original, a low resolution jpeg, that                 
obstructs data clarity. In ​My Neck is Thinner than a Hair​, Raad collects as much data                
as possible only to deny his own truth building capacity: “I’m not sure what you will                
know, and the same goes for the victims.” (Wilson-Goldie). In so doing, he seems              
almost to perform a what we might call a “Foucaultian tease”. In his lecture “What is                
Critique”, Foucault approaches some sort of “originary freedom” only to deny it and             
say: “I did not say that” (Foucault). In so doing Foucault stake freedom only to               
denounce it again. The Foucaultian tease opens a gap of potentiality where            
something might occur, but this something has still not taken on a fixed form or               
identity. In a similar fashion, the documents of the Atlas Group cannot be traced              
back to one singular artist or consistent and accountable subject, but a more or less               
fictitious group. This group again has just compiled the documents presented or            
offered to them by more or less delusional agents, chief investigators, secret police,             
documentary photographers and doctors. The Atlas Group’s fiction – becomes no           
less true, but true in its “power of being false” (Deleuze). In Ngai’s reading of Juliana                
Spar and Diana Wards poems, bureaucracy and complicity become the engine for            
creative production – a similarly bureaucratic, paranoid sensibility is at stake in ​The             
Thin Neck Files​. What seems as an almost auto-generated or generic mode of             
artistic production is punctuated by the always excessively poetic titles and an            
almost frantic sensibility for the materiality and affective qualities of the documents.            
And it is by alternating between those different scales and sensibilities that projects             
like ​The Thin Neck Files are able to capture the singularity of a situation while               
opening up to a larger ecology; that is how weak theory interacts with strong theory               
and creates a more ecological view of knowing. The assemblage does not attempt to              
restore history or build an all-encompassing grand theory, yet it is, as Raad note, the               
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That is when we can say that affect as a critical inquiry becomes a practice of the                 
“without” (Phelan and Rogoff). In Rogoff’s terms “without” becomes an epistemology           
that knows, but doesn’t know, a hermeneutics that desires the truth, but knows that              
the truth is true in its power of being false (Deleuze). (Para)paranoia or the feeling of                
“feeling car-bombed” is not something we sit and wait for because we find it sexy or                
titillating – even though it might be. It grips us like an act of violence and it forces a                   
reaction from us. But this reaction we are without, we do not have a prescribed               
mould which can fit adequately. We are, so to speak, given to each other’s textures –                
to find new practices and habits in order to continue living. But rather than seeing it                
as a without, I like to think of it as a with – or and – as an oversaturation of                    
temporalities existing within the same space as captured by the stanza of the             
“meanwhile & and at the same time”. Like the “without” the “meanwhile & and at the                
same time” has run up against the limits of the ordering capacity in question, but it is                 
by styling, enacting and assembling those fragments and habits that it is able to              
mutate the paranoid impulses into a creative practice. 
 
Concluding Notes 
Sedgwick’s critique of critical theory takes place at a methodological level and            
whether or not her enactment of a certain belated Cold-War paranoia in the             
mid-90s/early 2000s was a timely one, I do think it offers an important             
check-and-balance wake-up-call to remind us that our epistemological and         
methodological suitcase needs to be repacked in response to the multiple urgencies            
and contingencies facing us today. By enacting the very same paranoia that she sets              
out to criticise, Sedgwick’s call for the reparative practice is not a do away with               
critical enterprise, but to open our habitual ways of knowing and performing            
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Affect becomes a critical inquiry because it pushes us to the limits of our surest ways                
of knowing. In this passage – or urgency – the critical impasse has not yet taken a                 
form, it does not have a mould it can be fitted back into but is left open to                  
contingency. But at the same time, the affect also re-unites a passage where we              
become one with others; it forces us to create other affective assemblages of             
enunciation through a process of developing thought, practices and desires through           
juxtaposition and disjunction. This excessive repetitiveness opens up to a possibility           
of styling ethico-aesthetic practices of the “meanwhile and & at the same time”.  
It is thus not only a question of “What does knowledge do” but indeed how do we                 
perform knowledge or how to be attuned to the pursuit of knowledge as an affective               
enterprise, where suspicion and paranoia – might be one out of many possible             
affects. 
The reason why I have chosen to share with you my own personal anecdotes of               
being in proximity to the “feeling of feeling car bombed” is to show that there are                
certain instances when affect strikes, and strikes violently, demanding of the           
situation improvisation and being literally attuned “to the heartbeat of contingency”           
(Sedgwick). Affect becomes a critical inquiry which both forces a reaction from the             
affected body but also styles a new way of being in the world, which does not have a                  
mould or adequate form which it can easily slip into. Habit becomes central here, as               
the way in which subjects fashions their habitual mode into a new practice in order to                
continue living. And this is when the epistemic limits become closely tied to the              
ontological ones of what counts as a subject at all. Here I have argued with the work                 
of the Atlas Group that this style, or art of existence, becomes a collective,              
historically dense assemblage of materials, which operates on different affect-scales          
and scapes. In the end it is not true in building a strong theory, but true in its power                   
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With Judith Butler, I have tried to show that critique, or what we might situate with                
Rogoff as criticality, is not only a question of epistemology – what it means to know –                 
but also ties onto questions of ontology – who counts as a subject. As such, affect as                 
a critical inquiry becomes a practice of assemblages, of producing other affective            
milieus of enunciation (Guattari). Assemblages that cut across or queer other           
relational fabrics including social, physical, bodily (in the broadest possible sense),           
psychological, institutional, technical and machinic fragments into new        
co-assemblages. 
  
While the explosions for me were terrifying experience, for my mother in-law, who             
had lived her entire adulthood in this volatile situation, it became a moment to              
connect with friends and family from afar. This incident testify to that there are no               
such thing as “negative” / “positive” affects or “sad”/”happy” affects. Affects can take             
on a multiplicity of knowledges and feelings. (Para)paranoia is thus not necessarily a             
negative affect but rather a mitigating position that does not turn “the terror out of               
error” (Sedgwick), since in this case it was pure terror, but rather is able to migrate                
the destructive forces embedded in the paranoid impulse towards reparative ends.  
During that following trip to the mountains there was a sense in which our friendships               
slid up more intimately alongside one another. In Sedgwick words, “whatever else            
we know, we know there isn’t time to bullshit.” 
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[1] The Taif Agreement (1991), which brokered the peace agreement between the            
warring factions in Lebanon, 
gave amnesty to all the involved militias, which means that there has been no official               
truth and reconciliation 
process and no agreed upon narrative of the events. 
[2] In hindsight, the performance almost comes, unintentionally to mock or mimic the             
Hariri Tribunal before it happened. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) also            
referred to as the Hariri Trial in The International 
Criminal Court, The Hague, into the assassination of Rafic Hariri, could almost be             
seen as a large scale re-enactment of the performance. 
[3] In ​Cruel Optimism​, Lauren Berlant also turns to habit or ​intuitive rehabituation ​for              
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longer unlivable, situation” that is living with HIV/AIDS (Berlant). In Ngai’s reading of             
Juliana Spahr and Butler the subject’s inevitable complicity (or perhaps even her            
‘paranoia’) might eventually become “’the condition of agency rather than its           
destruction’” (Ngai 331). 
[4] In Rabih Mroué & Hito Steyerl’s performance lecture “Possible Title: Zero            
Probability” Mroué has an excellent expose of navigating from A – B, during the              
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